Helping Families Understand and Cope with Cults

 

CISNEO March, 2007 Newsletter
06: April/May  |  June  |  October  |  November
07
: February

 

PROGRAM/MEETING

Tuesday, March 13,  at Christ United Methodist Church. Regular Meeting begins at 7:30pm.  Board Meeting at 6:30pm.   Our program will be a video on the recent re-creation of the famous Stanley Milgram obedience experiment where subjects are tested to see how far they will cross ethical boundaries in order to please authority figures.  (February meeting was cancelled due to snow) 

Dues for 2007

Our Dues for the year 2007 are now due.  Cost is $20 for an individual, $30 for families.  Please bring to the meeting or send to the address above.  Please make checks payable to CISNEO.  

SAVE ACME RECEIPTS

Dorothy Jemson is again collecting Acme receipts which we use a fund raiser for CISNEO.  Please forward them to Dorothy at 1461 Westvale Ave., Akron, Ohio  44313.

 

Judge Approves Disclosure of Company's Efforts to Discredit Blogger-Critic
New York Law Journal, March 6, 2007  By Anthony Lin

A New York federal magistrate judge has ruled that a controversial executive seminar company cannot invoke attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of its efforts to discredit one of its most well-known critics. NXIVM Corp., formerly known as Executive Success Program Inc., operates a series of seminars that some say are intended to foster a cult-like following. One of the group's most outspoken critics has been anti-cult blogger and deprogrammer Rick A. Ross. NXIVM has sued Ross in New York and New Jersey for violating its copyright by disseminating NXIVM course materials.

In 2003, the group hired Joseph J. O'Hara, an Albany-based businessman and lobbyist also admitted to practice law in Washington, D.C., to draft a plan to deal with the negative publicity stemming from its litigation with Ross. While employed by NXIVM, O'Hara engaged private investigation firm Interfor, which produced a report on Ross, including information on his personal banking transactions and telephone calls. The report was also shared with Sitrick and Co., a Los Angeles public relations firm hired by O'Hara to counter Ross.   Interfor also set up a "sting" operation, luring Ross to a November 2004 meeting with a supposedly distraught mother who claimed her daughter was involved with NXIVM. At the time, Ross and NXIVM were engaged in litigation with both sides represented by counsel. Ross has claimed he was questioned at the meeting about the lawsuit and his legal strategy, without knowing Interfor had been hired by NXIVM. The distraught mother was portrayed by an actress.   O'Hara, who formally severed his business relationship with NXIVM in March 2005, was sued by the group a few months later for allegedly defrauding members Clare and Sara Bronfman, daughters of Edgar Bronfman Sr., of $2 million in loans and payments. The following year, O'Hara informed Ross about the Interfor report and sting operation. NXIVM's efforts against Ross were also shared with a reporter at the Albany alternative weekly Metroland, which published a story about them.

NXIVM asked Northern District Magistrate Judge Randolph Treece to grant a protective order, arguing that information about the Interfor report and sting were both covered by attorney-client privilege. But Treece ruled in NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 05-Civ.-1546, that both fell within exceptions to the privilege and could be subject to discovery by Ross.  The magistrate judge found that much of the work O'Hara was involved with at NXIVM did not merit protection because he was acting as a marketing and public relations consultant rather than a lawyer. But he said the parties clearly intended for such a privilege to apply after July 2004, at which time O'Hara re-constituted his Washington law practice, purely for the purpose of invoking attorney-client confidentiality.   The magistrate judge found that the Interfor report was an attorney work-product, but ruled that any protection had been stripped by NXIVM's sharing of the report with Sitrick with the goal of discrediting Ross in the press. "Delivering the Interfor Report to Sitrick was a deliberate, affirmative and selective strategic decision to disclose this information for another benefit other than aiding the lawyer pitched in the battled of litigation," Treece wrote. "The benefit was for the control of the airwaves and print media, which NXIVM hoped to profit ... A party cannot selectively share a work product and then expect it to remain as a shield."  The magistrate judge said information about the sting operation was subject to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. He said O'Hara, who attended meetings with Interfor at which the sting was discussed, should have known the fake meeting constituted a highly improper ex parte contact, and his acquiescence could be construed as an endorsement of the plan.  
 

Harness the power of persuasion
Montreal Gazette, February 17, 2007 By Donna Nebenzahl

Getting people to do what you want is easy. It's a matter of understanding six principles and being aware of people's basic biases - and then using them to influence their behaviour

If you want to influence people, don't tell them who's boss. "You know from experience that if you try to persuade using your positional power, most of the time it will backfire on you," said training and development consultant Heath Slawner. And even if you can get someone to do what you want because "you're the boss," they'll either quit doing it when you're not around or they won't innovate or ask questions.

That's human nature.  So it's imperative, in order to bring your own agenda forward, that you find ways to persuade the other person to move in your direction, even if it means changing their own direction in order to do so.  It was at a juncture in his career - the Wharton School graduate had left film marketing and production in Los Angeles to return to Montreal - that Slawner learned about the work of social psychologist Robert Cialdini.  "He was looking at what can we learn from science when it comes to influencing other people, about what causes people to say yes to someone's request," Slawner said.

He realized that his clients - including Merck Frosst, the United Nations and Reader's Digest, at Hart Resource Development, where he was a trainer and consultant - would benefit from learning the techniques of persuasion.

So Slawner became the first trainer in Canada formally certified in the Principles of Persuasion, a workshop in Cialdini's method. He offers training workshops as well as keynote presentations.  "It's pretty intellectual stuff, with a lot of nuance to it," he said. "People are using these principles all the time; it's just a matter of understanding them, and the biases we have as human beings."

The six principles Cialdini proposes are not mutually exclusive - it depends on the situation as to which principle or principles are to be used. Each one is based on human behaviour, elaborated in countless studies. 

The first one is reciprocity "It tells us that people feel obligated to give back to those who have given to them," Slawner said.  This is a deceptively simple principle, with some interesting applications, based on the notion that if you're the first person to give, you stand a better chance of getting back.  This mindset works in all kinds of situations.  Take networking, Slawner says, which can be tedious and feel so contrived. But if you go into a networking situation not thinking what it can do for you but what you can do for someone else, all kinds of situations open up. 

Or, consider that when you want to make a request, the order in which you make it can have a major impact on whether you will get it or not.       "As human beings we don't want to hear the word 'no,'" Slawner said.  The strategy is to start off with a bigger request, the one that is more likely to receive a negative answer. Then, when you move to a smaller request, you're more likely to get what you want.

There is an important caveat, which is that you don't make things up in order to act strategically. "The key is all of this needs to be done ethically; in applying the principles, it's extremely important," Slawner said.

The next principle is consensus, which tells us that when people are unsure what to do, they look to what others in similar situations are doing. We should never underestimate the guiding role that others play in our choices, Slawner says.  Like in business, when testimonials work as a way of assuring a new client, you try to influence someone in the workplace by letting them know what similar people are doing.  And make it positive, he says.  "Don't say: 'These six people haven't done this.' But that, 'These nine people have.' You want to normalize the behaviour you're seeking from other people and you do this by using consensus information."

Another principle is authority, because when people are unsure what to do, they often defer to legitimate experts, Slawner says. This becomes persuasive information in an argument.  "Of course, it depends on who your target sees as an expert; and it's all the better if you can position yourself as one."

Consistency is the fourth principle.  "Nobody wakes up in the morning looking to be erratic. We have a preference to align with our commitments," he said.  Let's say you want your company to adopt a course of action. If you can align your request with the company's values, you're going to make it harder for that company to say no to you.  "What we find is that values are one of the strongest ways you can influence someone," Slawner said. "It's not about changing your request, it's just about the way you make the request. Our challenge is understanding what it is that people hold important."

The next principle is scarcity This, too, is deceptively simple: people want more of what they think is scarce. They're afraid to lose out on opportunities.  So you can position your request by talking about what people stand to lose and make sure you use any new information at your disposal to make your case.

Information is an important tool, Slawner says, and describes it more like a bagel than wine. Rather than letting it age, you want it fresh and hot.  "If you have exclusive information, you've got something that is scarce and people will value it more highly because it's new and fresh. So you should share it right away," he said.   "And you may start to see how sharing information is a way you can invoke reciprocity."

The last principle is liking, which means that people prefer to say yes to someone they have a rapport or connections with - someone they know and like.  These principles apply in all types of business activities, from fundraising to leadership and coaching, Slawner said.  What it means is understanding that human beings have certain biases, and what activates their decision-making processes can have a deep impact on your results and your relationships.

The six principles of persuasion

Reciprocity: People feel obligated to give back to those who have given to them.

Consensus: When unsure of what to do, people tend to follow the lead of others in similar situations.

Authority: We defer to legitimate experts.

Consistency: People prefer to align with their commitments, beliefs and values.

Scarcity: People want more of what they can have less of.

Liking: We prefer to say yes to those we know and like.

Based on the research of Dr. Robert Cialdini, president of Influence At Work, author of Influence: Science and Practice and Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion.
 

Mates 'til the death
The Australian, February 19, 2007 By Sally Neighbour 

Terrorist cells are like cults whose members form close bonds and attack their own communities

"HE seemed a really kind man. He taught the really bad kids and everyone seemed to like him." So said a former pupil of Mohammad Sidique Khan, the 30-year-old teaching aide who led a cell of bombers who blew up three trains and a bus in London in July 2005, killing 56 people.

"I know my son. He's honest, he's got a clean record, and he has never been in trouble." These are the words of the tearful father of one of 22 men arrested in Melbourne and Sydney and soon to face trial on charges of belonging to a terrorist group and preparing for a terrorist attack.  Testimonials like these are often repeated as families, friends and communities struggle to confront the new face of terrorism - the emergence of "home grown" terror cells around the world.

The first wave of the Islamist jihad, masterminded by bearded fanatics living in caves in Afghanistan, was shocking enough, but somehow simpler to comprehend.  Much harder to fathom is this second wave, a phenomenon the British authorities call neighbour terrorism - middle-class family men from the suburbs of London and Melbourne, Sydney and Toronto, willing to wreak death and destruction where they were born and grew up. This troubling trend has academics and counter-terrorism specialists around the worldwide redoubling their efforts to understand the causes of radicalisation - in short, what makes a terrorist.

"There is much about the nature of Islamist terrorism that is not fully understood, including in particular the fundamental question of the 'transmission belt' from religious belief to terrorism," Peter Varghese, head of Australia's Office of National Assessments, told a security conference in Canberra last year.  ONA has teams of analysts working full-time to apprehend a threat that Varghese describes as "growing and spreading to more countries", stemming from a large, diverse and fluid network, that is more often inspired by al-Qa'ida than directed by it.

As Varghese pointed out, no study has been able to explain why some people become terrorists. But a clear pattern is emerging. A key feature is what he calls "socio-psychological factors and questions of identity".   Terrorist cells have "striking parallels" to cults, Varghese explained. "One thing we frequently see in the trajectory of terrorists is a conversion experience that occurs within a small, tight-knit group. The dynamics of such groups tend to reinforce personal conviction, especially among individuals whose other social networks have frayed or can't match the intensity of bonds forged in what is for them an existential struggle."   This assessment is echoed by former CIA field officer turned psychiatrist, author and government adviser, Marc Sageman, in his book Understanding Terror Networks. Cutting through the jargon, Sageman uses a simpler term - he calls it the "bunch of guys" theory.

Sageman knows Islamic extremists better than most, having worked with the Afghan mujahidin in the late 1980s during the anti-Soviet war, the crucible for the present global jihad.   After studying the lives of 172 terrorists, Sageman found the most common factor driving them was the potent social bonds within their terrorist cell. Most started as friends, colleagues or relatives - just "a bunch of guys" drawn ever closer by bonds of friendship, loyalty, solidarity and trust, and rewarded by a powerful sense of belonging and collective identity.     Sageman cites a string of cases to demonstrate his theory - Mohammed Atta's Hamburg cell of 9/11 bombers; the three brothers at the core of the Bali bombing team - Muklas, Amrozi and Ali Imron; and the would-be millennium bombers who planned to attack Los Angeles airport in 2000.

These and other cells reveal a three-step process in becoming a terrorist. First comes social affiliation through friendship, kinship or discipleship (as in the followers of Abu Bakar Bashir). Next comes progressive intensification of beliefs and faith within the group. The final step is encountering a link to the jihad, and then joining it. This is usually a "bottom-up" process; most are "enthusiastic joiners" not brainwashed recruits.   Sageman's study shows, as others have, that the common stereotype of the terrorist as poor, desperate, naive or just plain "mad" is a myth. There is simply no psychological profile of a terrorist and no evidence that mental illness, personality disorder or childhood trauma feature among their ranks.    Three-quarters of the terrorists in Sageman's sample were upper or middle class. They were typically more educated than average, skilled, upwardly mobile and married with children. Many, especially the leaders, were educated in the West, multilingual and cosmopolitan. (The late Azhari Husin, the Australian-educated PhD professor who became Jemaah Islamiah's master bomb-maker and his colleague from the University of Technology in Malaysia, JI's current operational leader Noor Din Mohammed Top are two examples).   Another key finding of Sageman's work is that most of the terrorists went to secular schools. Only 23 per cent had exclusively Islamic education. (The exception is Indonesia, where the level of religious schooling was much higher.)   Furthermore, only about half were religious in childhood. The rest experienced a "shift in devotion" later - a crucial factor in their transformation, but not the cause. This concurs with Varghese's observation that most terrorists have little history of extremism, or even religious piety. Contrary to popular belief, religion is clearly not the driving force.

These themes are explored further by Harvard Law School professor and long-time terrorism specialist, Louise Richardson, in her book What Terrorists Want. Richardson has studied dozens of terrorist groups, from the Palestinian zealots of antiquity and the assassins of medieval times to the IRA in her native Northern Ireland where she grew up a child of the troubles. Richardson's starting point is that terrorism is neither a new strategy nor the work of a bunch of mad fanatics, but rather "an age-old political phenomenon that can be understood in rational terms".   Richardson writes: "Group, organisational and social psychology are more helpful than individual psychology in explaining terrorist behaviour."   Drawing on interviews with dozens of terrorists, she says many speak of an "intense feeling of camaraderie within the group" and "an overarching sense of the collective", which consumes the individual. Richardson identifies a "lethal cocktail" of three key ingredients that make a terrorist: a "disaffected individual", an "enabling community" and a "legitimising ideology".

The idea of the "disaffected individual" resonates strongly in Australia. Think of the troubled Sydneysider Mamdouh Habib, who spent nearly three years in Guantanamo Bay; the alcoholic divorcee Jack Roche, currently serving nine years for conspiring to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra; or the Adelaide cowboy turned Taliban fighter, David Hicks.   Converts such as Roche and Hicks are drawn to Islam by its empowering ethic of egalitarianism, brotherhood and social justice. For a young man in search of meaning, Sageman says fundamentalist Islam offers "elegance and simplicity" and "a single solution devoid of ambiguity". As interpreted by the extremists, it also offers a justification for acts of violence.

As for the cause of the average recruit's "disaffection", alienation is a powerful recurring theme. Out of Sageman's group of 172 terrorists, 115 (70 per cent) joined the jihad movement while in a country other than their homeland, as students, refugees, workers or fighters living abroad, while cut off from their family, friends and culture. Another 14 were second-generation immigrants.   These figures add up to a total of 78 per cent who were "socially alienated, or temporarily disembedded, from their societies of origin". Sageman concludes that "this absence of connection is a necessary condition" for joining the global jihad.

After joining, the cell becomes the new recruit's world. As the bonds within it grow ever stronger, his ties to all other groups grow weaker. This "in-group love" is strengthened by what Sageman calls a "common bond of victimhood based on Islam". And it is paralleled by growing "out-group hate", which in turn is sharpened by the identification of a common enemy - such as the US and its allies. The internet plays a pivotal role in strengthening the sense of belonging and collective identity enjoyed by those who join, and enhancing their disconnection from the outside world. In cyberspace they become part of a much larger virtual community, without the constraints of earthly society. As Sageman writes, this "ideal virtual community" has strong appeal for alienated youths living in immigrant communities in the West.

This process of disconnection helps explain how a young man takes the final step to carrying out a terrorist act. "They become embedded in a socially disembedded network, which, precisely because of its lack of any anchor to any society, is free to follow abstract and apocalyptic notions of a global war between good and evil."   Much the same conclusions can be found in the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on July 7 2005, which describes how the kind and dedicated teaching aide known as Sid organised the London cell with his friend Shehzad Tanweer, a "friendly, mature and modest" university graduate, who worked in the family fish and chip shop, drove a red Mercedes Benz bought for him by his father and played for a local cricket team.

The report finds that the process of indoctrination for the London bombers was principally through "personal contact and group bonding". While sometimes attendance at a radical mosque or contact with an extreme spiritual leader can be influential, a more critical factor is the role of personal mentors and then bonding within a group, in which members "begin feeding off each other's radicalisation".   The report notes, "There is little evidence of overt compulsion. The extremists appear rather to rely on development of individual commitment, group bonding and solidarity".   The notion of cultural and social alienation also applies to the London cell. Clive Walker, a terrorism specialist of the University of Leeds, home town of the bombers, has expanded on this theme. He sees the London cell as "a group of young men caught between the conservative and unreplicable culture of their parents and the apparently unappealing culture of the West".   Walker writes: "The problem may not lie in mosques at all, but in the problems of a second generation ethnic minority". A minority whose members feel alienated from the social and cultural values of the larger community around them. This certainly rings true in Australia, where most of the men charged with terrorism have been second and third generation Australians, brought up in the displaced cultures of their parents.

While religion is clearly not the main driver, it does play a crucial role for the terrorists who embrace it. In Richardson's words, "it provides a unifying, all-encompassing philosophy or belief system that legitimates and elevates their actions".   Richardson cites Osama bin Laden, whose oft-repeated demands are clearly political - the removal of foreign forces from Saudi Arabia, an end to hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan - but who utilises religion to legitimise his actions and persuade followers that their struggle is sanctioned by God.   It is this conviction that makes the terrorist who claims to be inspired by his religion the most terrifying of all.

"Islamic fundamentalists tend to see the world in terms of an enduring and cosmic struggle between good and evil," Richardson writes. They are therefore less prone to compromise, "more fanatical, more willing to inflict mass casualties more absolutist, more transnational and more dangerous".

Sally Neighbour is a senior reporter with The Australian and Four Corners and the author of In the Shadow of Swords, on the trail of terrorism.

 

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